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ABSTRACT

THE STATES, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL CHANGE: AN ANALYSIS OF ROE
V. WADE AND OBERGEFELL V. HODGES

Kaitlyn Gradecki, MA
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2017
J. Mitch Pickerill, Director

This study analyzes when and under what conditions the Supreme Court can produce
lasting social change. By re-examine Gerald Rosenberg’s theory and finding that the Court is too
constitutionally constrained to produce change, I argue that the Supreme Court can establish
lasting social change. Lasting social change is established through landmark rulings on substantive
rights when those issues first have the time to percolate in the states and build the public support
necessary to implement the Court’s ruling. To test this theory, I analyze two landmark Court
rulings. First, I examine the right to abortion in Roe v. Wade (1973) where the Supreme Court lead
the constitutional debate, and second the right to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges
(2015) as a counterfactual, as the Supreme Court ruling followed the constitutional debate. These
cases are analyzed in conjunction with public opinion trends to understand how state constitutional
debate contributes to public approval of the right at issue. Based on the analysis, the Supreme
Court can establish lasting social change when handing down landmark rulings after the
constitutional and political debate has already occurred at the state level.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The American political climate in the wake of the 2016 presidential election is one of both
political and ideological polarization. In both the government and the electorate, liberals are
severely to the left of the ideological scale while the conservatives stand far to the right. During
this political time, issues concerning substantive rights, many of which include a moral component
such as abortion and same-sex marriage, are focal points of American political dialogue and
debate. Yet, the political and ideological divide leaves little gray area for compromise regarding
these issues as one side is campaigning for a limit on restrictions and regulations while the other
desires the outlaw of these rights altogether. With a country so focused on the protection of
constitutional rights, one must question what is the most effective way to produce lasting social
change in America?
Americans expect their rights to be protected under the safeguards of the Constitution. The
democratic process at the state level has traditionally played an important role in determining what
rights deserve such constitutional protection (Fornieri 2014, 31). However, an option being used
more frequently in current American politics is to turn to the federal government and the Supreme
Court to settle debates regarding the constitutional interpretation of substantive rights. Overlooked
is that the United States Constitution is not merely a legal document open to interpretation by legal
institutions. More importantly, the Constitution is also a governing document that structures
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politics and political debates (Whittington 1999, 1). Thanks to our federal structure of government
democratic debate at both the state and federal levels. While the Court has previously been
successful in securing new substantive rights through activist rulings, when is the Court most
effective at establishing lasting social change? Does first turning to the Supreme Court for its
power of judicial review and constitutional interpretation produce lasting social change? Or, is
social change more likely to be secured when the states participate in the political and
constitutional debate before it reaches the Supreme Court?
In the first section of this paper I review the relevant literature for this study. I theorize that
the Supreme Court can be effective in establishing lasting social change through the nationalization
of new constitutional rights after the democratic process has run its course through the states. In
the second section I examine the cases of Roe v. Wade (1973) and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015).
The issue of abortion through Roe is used as the baseline, where the Court became involved early
in the democratic process, and the issue of same-sex marriage in Obergefell is used as a
counterfactual. Comparing these two cases, along with public opinion trends, help build an
understanding of when the Court can most effectively produce lasting social change without
backlash. I argue that ultimately, the Court entering the constitutional debate at a later time in the
democratic process enable the individual states to build the political and social support necessary
for a decision to be implemented effectively, and thus decisions such as Obergefell create more
durable precedent.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholarship on when and under what conditions the Supreme Court can be an effective
agent of lasting social change is varied. Gerald Rosenberg argues that the judicial impact of
Supreme Court decisions is limited in its scope due to the constitutional constraints of the Court.
Yet, others view the Supreme Court as a vehicle for social justice due to its historical willingness
to overturn legislation at both the state and federal level. This approach to understanding judicial
activism has been driven by the legitimizing effect that Court decisions have had on the acceptance
of rights. However, the Supreme Court is not the final arbiter of constitutional interpretation and
enhancing the protection of rights and liberties (Fisher 1985). This is especially true when those
issues are morally contentious in nature. If the Court acts too quickly in deciding matters of
important social change and substantive rights, the Court and its decision can become susceptible
to backlash from more political branches of government. Our federal structure of government
becomes important because it enables the states to become pivotal players, along with the Supreme
Court, in the constitutional deliberation of new rights.
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Judicial Impact

Law and courts scholars “have long been interested in the judicial impact” of the courts on social
policy (Keck and Strother 2016, 2). Specifically, scholars want to understand when the court is
effective in altering policy and politics in a significant way to illicit social change (Keck and
Strother 2016, 2). Court decisions shape political and public behavior as well as “induce
responses” from those political actors and the public in response to those decisions (Becker 1969;
Keck and Strother 2016, 2). Research on the role played by the courts in our governing system
aids in creating a better understanding of how judicial decisions not only shape law but further
affect the public and the democratic process (Keck and Strother 2016, 2). Judicial impact studies
help to explain how the courts can affect political and social change.
The implementation of Supreme Court decisions which nationalize new constitutional
rights can impact society and induce social change. For that social change to be lasting it must
have the effect of significantly altering public behaviors, morals, and values in relation to the newly
interpreted right. Another factor attributing to enduring social change is a lack of political backlash
in response to the Court’s ruling, which allows for effective implementation of the decision.
Scholars, however, question whether this type of social change can be produced by the Court alone.
Gerald Rosenberg, in his book The Hollow Hope, questions whether the court can actually
produce political and social change. Rosenberg states that Americans look to courts “as fulfilling
an important role in the American scheme” (Rosenberg 2008, 2). The judicial branch of
government is expected to defer to the elected branches while also being “the guardian of
fundamental rights” and the protectors of liberty (Scheingold 1974; Rosenberg 2008, 3). If the
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court is constrained by the political branches of government, the people, and the Constitution,
“when and under what conditions will U.S. courts be effective producers of significant social
reform?” (Rosenberg 2008, 9).
As Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist 78, the judicial branch is the weakest branch
of government as it only has the power to judge the constitutionality of acts, and lacks the ability
to act in order to implement its decisions. Rosenberg lays out three institutional constraints placed
upon the Court: “the limited nature of constitutional rights, the lack of judicial independence, the
judiciary’s lack of powers of implementation” (Rosenberg 2008, 35). The Court is constrained by
precedent, isolated from politics, and beholden to others for implementation of its decisions. Based
on these institutional constraints, Rosenberg theorizes two different types of courts; the
Constrained Court and the Dynamic Court. The Constrained Court is most restricted by its
institutional deficiencies and consequently unable to produce political or social change.
Conversely, the Dynamic Court is not hindered by its institutional constraints and has the capacity
to produce political and social change better than the other branches of government. Rosenberg
theorizes that unless courts can overcome their institutional constraints, they “will generally not
be effective producers of significant social reform” (Rosenberg 2008, 10). However, if courts find
legal support in precedent, gain the support of the federal government, and have the support to
mobilize implementation, they may produce political and social reform.
By looking at litigation and the use of the courts at the national level by civil rights,
women’s rights, criminal law reformers, and same-sex marriage, Rosenberg found that neither the
Constrained nor Dynamic Court view could fully capture or explain the use of the Court in these
situations. Rather, the Court’s decisions were not the sole factor of the produced social change,
merely a response to social change already in progress. He finds that the Dynamic Court view does
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not exist and that any policy impact, resulting in social change, is produced by the legislature and
confirmed by the Court when necessary. Additionally, though there may have been legal victories,
the Court could not bring about the desired social change as a solitary actor due to the lack of elite
political and public support necessary to implement the decision. Rosenberg ultimately argues that
“the constraints derived from the Constrained Court view best capture the capacity of the courts to
produce significant social reform” (Rosenberg 2008, 420). Due to the Court’s institutional
constraints, and lack of implementation power, the Court will be incapable of producing political
or social change.
Rosenberg states that the Supreme Court has seemingly become an important producer of
political and social change because “Americans look to activist courts” as fulfilling their desire for
a new interpretation of constitutional rights (Rosenberg 2008, 2). Rosenberg notes that in most
cases where court decisions are perceived to have been successful in producing social change, a
closer look shows that change is often the result of political efforts already in progress. What
Rosenberg’s theory does not account for is exactly where these political campaigns initially began
and why they resulted in a successful implementation of the Court’s ruling. Instead, Rosenberg’s
theory focuses specifically on the effect Supreme Court decisions have in producing social change.
While Rosenberg’s theory does account for the states’ role in identifying backlash against court
decisions, he does not go very far into understanding the role of the states in constitutional dialogue
surrounding new constitutional rights. Rosenberg does not consider, to a great extent, the role of
state politics and constitutional deliberation which build the political and public support necessary
for successful implementation of court decisions. Therefore, understanding the relative role of the
states may help in building a theory of the role of the Supreme Court in establishing social change
and provide insight into the relationship between states and the Court in doing so.

7

Judicial Activism

In recent history, the Supreme Court has been criticized by both liberals and conservatives
for interpreting precedent or striking it down in an effort for legal policy to reflect their own
ideologies and policy preferences. 1 When justices make these types of value laden decisions, which
add a political nature to the independent judicial power, they are partaking in judicial activism. In
contemporary American politics, scholars are particularly interested in judicial activism as elite
political polarization has led to judicial rulings suspected of going against the rule of law. These
court decisions based on the personal and political considerations of the justices rather than
precedent have the effect of shaping not only law but politics as well.
Considering the role of activist court decisions and the asserted notion of judicial
supremacy, it is understandable why people often look to the courts in hopes of eliciting some type
of change. Article III of the United States Constitution states that the “judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court” (Epstein and Walker 2014). John Marshall, in the
landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison (1803), further clarified that the judicial power is the
power to interpret the Constitution and strike down legislation that is in violation of it. How far of
a reach does this power of judicial review extend in matters of constitutional interpretation?
American government rests upon the normative foundation of the rule of law; government of law,
not people. This normative goal attempts to protect the people from arbitrary rule by holding
governing actors accountable under the law. Law and politics, however, often overlap in

1

For scholarship on judicial activism see: Bickel 1955 and 1986, Dworkin 1977, Howard and Segal 2004, Keck
2004, Sunstein 1999.
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complicated ways. This is not altogether surprising considering that political actors construct and
implement the law and judicial decision making is often based upon both legal and extralegal
factors (George and Epstein 1992, 324).
Both sides of the political spectrum critique, but also rely upon, judicial activism as a
method of entrenching competing rights claims within society. Liberal activism focuses on the
protection of civil rights and liberties while conservative activism focuses on restraint and limited
government. By considering the progression of the Warren Court activism to the ‘modern’
activism of the Rehnquist Court, one can understand the different objectives of judicial activist
rulings and the effect such rulings had upon democracy.
The Warren Court (1953-1969) is considered one of the most activist courts in history,
where the “legislative alterations of the Constitution” are thick and “organized by the theme of
equality and rights” (Bork 1990, 72). The Warren Court was the first to recognize a right to privacy
in the Bill of Rights along with the penumbras of later constitutional amendments in the landmark
decision of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965). Robert Bork criticizes the activism of the Warren
Court decisions by saying that “it is not the function of a judge to decide what is good” for society
by interpreting their own values into the Constitution and obliterating state and federal policies
(1990 81, 129). Rather, alterations in policy are the duty of the democratic process. Thomas Keck,
on the other hand, argues that the Court has more often than not shown great deference to state
governments and Congress and that to ignore such judicial restraint is short sighted (2004, 81).
The objective of the Warren Court was simply “to police the democratic process” (Keck 2004, 72).
The Warren Court activist decisions transformed the role of the Court and cast it into an
affirmatively political role (Devins 1996, 19).
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Many consider the Warren Court to be the most activist in judicial history, though others
argue this understanding downplays the activism of the Rehnquist Court. While the Warren Court
struck down 23 congressional acts, the Rehnquist Court struck down a total of 40 congressional
acts (Keck 2004, 40). One objective of the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) was to promote new
federalism to shift power from the federal government back to the states (Pickerill and Clayton
2004). Federalism is deemed to be an important constitutional value, as American government is
predicated on a balance of power between the many state governments and one federal
government. Traditionally, the Court has given Congress great deference and leeway when
enacting regulatory legislation over the states. However, Congress at times has overstepped its
constitutional boundaries in regulating areas of law traditionally controlled by the states. This has
led the Court to return its focus to their duty of maintaining the institutional structure of federalism
and the important role state governments and courts play.
The framers of the Constitution entrusted the federal courts with the duty to maintain the
balance between the states and the federal government. The Constitution provides the framework
for determining the allocation of powers, while “politics provides the details, as Congress passes
specific laws” and “the judicial system decides whether Congress has constitutionally exceeded
its authority” (Lens 2001, 321). Scholars have argued, however, that the political process is a more
suitable safeguard of federalism than the Court. Herbert Wechsler argues that the republican form
of American government, derived and maintained by the people, is the most prominent safeguard
of federalism (1954, 546). The “composition and selection” of the legislature inherently represents
state interests and translates them into national objectives (Wechsler 1954, 546). Further, Larry
Kramer argues that the bureaucratic structure of the federal government creates a dependence upon
the states to implement programs, and in turn allows for the states to control their interests in
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Washington (2000, 285). John Yoo, however, argues that that the “founding generation believed
judicial review would apply to questions of federal and state power in case the normal political
checks on Congress might fail” (1997, 1314). The Court’s role in maintaining the balance of power
between the state and federal governments is to protect individual and states’ rights from federal
encroachment when the political system has failed.
The Rehnquist Court rejected the political safeguards approach and through its rulings
allowed “state and local governments the flexibility to administer policy at their discretion”
(Pickerill and Clayton 2004, 237). Most notably, the Rehnquist Court gave states greater ability to
regulate abortion policy in its landmark decision of Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) and
limited the extension of Congress’s commerce power over the states in United States v. Lopez
(1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000). By the Court striking down congressional legislation for
unconstitutionally extending the reach of the commerce power to the states, the Rehnquist Court
gave birth to a new form of judicial activism. This new judicial activism had the effect of
reinvigorating the concept of federalism as an important constitutional value, specifically
regarding the protection of the state’s role (Lens 2001, 320).

Federalism and the Role of the States

Federalism “requires fluidity” to work properly, where the states and the federal
government decide together which “level of government can best address a particular problem at
a particular time” (Lens 2001, 330). The increase in “federal judicial activism in civil liberties
cases” between the 1930s and 1970s, however, made states and their respective courts
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underestimate their own capacity to guarantee rights and liberties for their constituents (Tarr 1994,
65). The federal government was viewed as more capable than the states of ensuring the wellbeing of the country and its citizens. Yet, state governments and the advancement in states’ rights
are an improvement on government responsiveness to local interests and policies (Yoo 1998; Lens
2001, 329). The protections provided to state governments through federalism allow for the states
to “act to extend individual liberties beyond those provided by the national government” (Yoo
1998; Lens 2001, 329). Such innovative thinking has given birth to a new judicial federalism. State
courts have recovered the “neglected tradition in state constitutional law” of increasingly relying
upon state constitutions and “state declarations of rights to secure rights unavailable under the U.S.
Constitution” instead of reaching out to the Supreme Court (Tarr 1994, 63). This rationale was not
lost on the Court. In his dissenting opinion in Michigan v. Long (1983), Justice Brennan, the
“godfather of the new judicial federalism,” advised the states that in matters of state constitutional
interpretation, that if they are to rely on federal precedent, they should stipulate that its purpose is
advisory in nature, and that such law is not the sole basis for the state courts decision (Tarr 1994,
73). By doing so, the state courts may then protect individual rights at an increased level, void of
intervention.
Ironically, “the activism of the Warren Court, which was often portrayed as detrimental to
federalism” was a necessary catalyst to produce “vigorous state involvement in protecting civil
liberties” (Tarr 1994, 73). “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition” and the states have
headed the call to counteract the federal governments monopoly over constitutional interpretation
(Federalist 51; Pickerill 2004, 30). Throughout the states there has been an emergence of civil
liberties and constitutional jurisprudence, with a softened reliance upon the tradition of judicial
restraint in order to protect new interpretation of individual rights. Some may contend that
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federalism is obsolete and nothing more than a means to an end. The Supreme Court, however, in
redefining the concept of federalism as a division of power “among the national government, the
states, and individual citizen,” provides a reminder that federalism is still a valuable and important
component of the American political structure (Lens 2001, 319).

Who Should Interpret the Constitution?

It is widely assumed that the judicial branch, specifically the Supreme Court, is the only
institution with the power to interpret the Constitution. The “myth of judicial finality has deep
power” (Ginsburg 1997, 752). This is the result of not only the Court’s blunt statements of their
own supremacy in interpreting the Constitution, but also due to the power of legitimacy in the
Court’s decisions. Both the Warren and Rehnquist Court have explicitly stated in landmark
decisions that the judicial power to interpret the Constitution is supreme. The foundation of judicial
supremacy rests upon the words of John Marshall. Found in the opinion of the landmark decision
of Marbury v. Madison (1803), Marshall stated that the courts “say what the law is” (Devins 1996,
11). The Warren Court in Cooper v. Aaron (1958) declared for itself, citing the words of John
Marshall, that it should be accepted that “the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme
in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by
this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system”
(Cooper v. Aaron (1958), 358 U.S. 1, 18; Devins 1996, 5). During the Rehnquist Court, Justice
Kennedy stated in the majority opinion of City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), that Congress “has been
given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation” (City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), 521 U.S. 507, 519). Though the Court may cling to
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this idealized notion of judicial supremacy, that Supreme Court decisions are the last word in
matters of constitutional controversy and interpretation, such a principle is unfounded in the
Constitution. In all actuality, claims of judicial supremacy are nothing more than a judicial defense
mechanism against backlash by political institutions when activist decisions are made (Devins
1996, 22). Though it may be common to assume that all other forms of democratic government
must defer to the decisions of the Supreme Court, “constitutional interpretation is an interactive,
ongoing political process, in which the Supreme Court plays an important but not definitive role”
(Ginsburg 1997, 749). Courts are not the final voice, but merely a single chapter in the book.
In reality no governing entity, not even the judiciary, has a monopoly over the finality of
constitutional interpretation (Fisher 1985, 746). Rather, “Congress, the White House,
governmental agencies, and the states all play critical, interdependent roles in interpreting Supreme
Court decisions and the Constitution itself” (Devins 1996, 23). When political debate arises
regarding a new right or policy, a dialogue begins between the political and legal branches of the
government. At both the state and federal levels, each institution is responding to the others’
opinion on the constitutionality of the issue.
Thus, constitutional interpretation is a dynamic process. In recognizing the importance of
non-judicial actors participating in constitutional dialogues, it is important to recognize that
constitutional doctrine is developed in “all branches of government, state as well as federal”
(Whittington 1999, 1; Pickerill 2004, 18). State governments are often overlooked in constitutional
dialogues as over time Americans have traded in regional identities for a single national identity.
State judges and officials, just like their federal counterparts, “take an oath ‘to support and defend
the Constitution,’ and put this oath into effect through interpretations of both the U.S. Constitution
and their state constitutions” (Devins 1996, 38). Constitutional issues do not always fall on
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“technical legal points but on a balancing of competing political and social values” (Fisher 1985,
743). Therefore, state actors are situated in the more favorable position to respond to public
sentiments. State interpretation of their own constitutions gives them the capacity to “provide
broader individual rights protections than those mandated by the Supreme Court” (Devins 1996,
38). The unique position of some state judges makes them susceptible to public will if unfavorable
decisions are handed down. For this reason, state courts are an “important part of the constitutional
dialogue that takes place between the Supreme Court and elected officials” (Devins 1996, 39). The
fact that state governments and courts play a vital role in constitutional interpretation is evidence
that their place in our federal structure and government is still important.

How is Social Change Constructed?

Rosenberg’s measure of the Court’s success in bringing about political or social change
seems to be all or nothing. Either the Court was successful in producing the desired change on
their own institutional merits or was entirely unsuccessful. Normatively speaking, however, the
success of the Dynamic Court view would equate to a totalitarian rule by the Supreme Court. The
judicial duty of the Court is to rule on matters of constitutionality through legal means to decide
whether the government’s denial of a right is just or unjust pursuant to the Constitution. While the
Court may at times make activist decisions, the judicial duty is not to politically debate the merits
of an individual right based on the personal ideologies and policy preferences of justices. That
duty belongs to the people and the political branches of government.
The Supreme Court’s inability to produce political and social change on its own
institutional merits does not necessarily capture the entire picture. Rosenberg is correct in stating
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that the Court is ineffective at producing change, without the aid of other branches of government,
due to their lack of implementation power. This institutional constraint placed upon the Court
should not be viewed as an issue but rather viewed as the success of our federal structure of
government and the separation of powers. It takes incremental steps and grassroots political efforts
to establish the support necessary for Court decisions to be implemented effectively. While the
Court is an important player in establishing new constitutional rights, activist decisions and decrees
of judicial supremacy can only go so far. The Court must work with and rely on the other branches
and levels of government in order to have any type of successful impact on society. This is not to
say that the Court is weaker than the other political branches of government by the reliance on
others to bring about social change. Rather, the Court is only part of a larger political system.
Therefore, establishing social change is a dynamic process requiring the work of all the branches
of government at both the state and federal level.
The Court may lack the power to implement their own decisions but the Court is even less
effective in contributing to change when there exists no apparent political consensus. When
considering how Court decisions are implemented the focus is often on the Executive, having the
power of the sword, and/or Congress, which has the power of the purse. By focusing on these
federal branches of government, however, the states are often overlooked. This is an issue because
the Court’s ability to effectively produce social change begins at the state level, as the states are
instrumental in building political and social support that even the most powerful rights claims
would fail without (Rosenberg 2008, 418). States have the autonomy to define their own regional
identities and policies which “generally reflect the ideologies and beliefs of the state’s citizens”
(Lewis and Soo Oh 2008, 42). States legislatures are laboratories of democracy and state courts
are laboratories of law. As such, these state governing institutions have the capacity to protect
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individual rights at a higher level than the federal government. As states start adopting policy and
establishing court doctrine, overtime the public within that state will become more accepting of
affording legal protection to newly desired rights. Only after such a time, when a few outlier states
remain in opposition to protecting the new right, will the states turn to the Court for their stamp of
constitutional approval

CHAPTER 3
THEORY

The Supreme Court, as Rosenberg stated, is institutionally constrained by its lack of
implementation power. However, this does not mean that the Court cannot effectively nationalize
social change by providing a right with the Court’s stamp of constitutional approval. Drawing on
Rosenberg, I posit two types of Courts: the Pre-Court and the Post-Court. The Pre-Court leads the
political discussion when there exists a controversy over a newly desired right and its
constitutionality. While prior dialogue may have existed between and amongst the states regarding
the right at issue, the Pre-Court will act in an activist manner and rule on the constitutionality of
the right prior to a majority consensus amongst the states. The Pre-Court will have provided the
contested right with their stamp of constitutional approval. However, these decisions are made
before the states have had the opportunity to establish the political and public support necessary
for the effective implementation of the Court’s decision. As a result, the states will push back
against the Courts ruling. This will hinder the effective implementation of the Court’s decision and
create further conflict over the right at issue. Though the Court has nationalized a new right, the
Pre-Court is not effective in contributing to lasting social change as it is unable to sort out the
complexity of the issue and build enough support at the state level.
The Post-Court, on the other hand, follows the political discussion and trends of the states
when disagreement over a new interpretation of a specific right and its constitutionality. While
constitutional questions may be presented to the Court regarding the right at issue, the Court
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restrains itself and leaves the issue with the states. The states then, through political grassroots
efforts and state court rulings, debate the constitutionality of the right. This constitutional dialogue
within and amongst the states overtime results in higher levels of political and public support of
the contested right. Only once a majority of the states have afforded the right at issue legal
recognition and protection, with only a few outlier states not recognizing the right, will the PostCourt rule on the rights constitutionality. By the Court restraining the use of its judicial power until
after a majority of the states adopts the right, and only then providing the contested right with the
Court’s stamp of constitutional approval will the decision be effectively implemented. This is
because the issue percolating in the states will have garnered the political and public support
necessary for a Court decision to result in enduring social change.
This study is not interested with whether or not the Supreme Court can produce social
change better than the political institutions. Rather, this study is concerned with how the Court can
ensure that their rulings will most effectively be implemented so as to contribute to enduring social
change. Therefore, I theorize that as issues percolate in the states through the democratic process
and overtime trends develop indicating widespread support for the issue, Supreme Court decisions
made following the establishment of these trends will be more likely to contribute to lasting social
change. Based on this theory, I derive two hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: When the Court establishes
a new nation-wide constitutional right after a critical mass of states have passed laws protecting
the same right, the Court’s decision will be more likely to influence social change; and conversely,
less likely to result in backlash. Hypothesis 2: When the Court establishes a new nation-wide
constitutional right after a long-term trend of shifting public opinion to support that right has been
established, the Court’s decision will be more likely to influence social change; and conversely,
less likely to result in backlash.

CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN

I argue that the Supreme Court will be most effective in handing down landmark
constitutional decisions which result in lasting social change when they are responding to the
constitutional debate rather than leading it. Constitutional debate is a fluid process and occurs at
each level of government, in both political and judicial institutions. Therefore, it is necessary to
look beyond specific variables which explicitly shape constitutional values and interpretation of
specific government actors and take a look at the larger picture of constitutional deliberation. In
order to fully understand this dynamic process, it is necessary to understand the actual
constitutional debate that occurs at both the state and federal levels as well as the dialogue between
the different levels of government. Constitutional decision-making is then “most vividly seen
through case studies” (Devins 1996, 41).
The theory I am presenting can be best understood through Roe v. Wade (1973) and
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). The central issue in both cases is related to substantive rights and
each issue was involved in constitutional debate either before or after the ruling was handed down.
These two cases help create an explanation regarding the importance of federalism and
constitutional debate between the states and the federal government in order to establish lasting
social change when dealing with substantive rights issues. Both are landmark Supreme Court cases
regarding the constitutionality of a substantive right and each had the effect of producing quick
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social change by nationalizing that right. Roe and Obergefell differ, however, in regards to the
progress of constitutional debates prior to the Supreme Court decision.
I chose the cases of Roe and Obergefell for three specific reasons. First, these cases are
meant to control for Rosenberg’s existing theory where he posits that the Dynamic Court does not
exist as the Court is too constitutionally constrained to produce social change. Second, these cases
satisfy the necessary condition that, at some point in the constitutional debate, political and
constitutional dialogues existed between and amongst the states, as well as, between the states and
the Supreme Court. Third, these cases provide the best fit for demonstrating the phenomenon
which is the central concern of this study; under what conditions the Court can produce lasting
social change.
To test his theories of the Dynamic and Constrained Court view Rosenberg made use of
the Court’s decision on abortion rights through Roe. Rosenberg found that at first glance the
decision in Roe could support a Dynamic Court view, however, his initial finding came to be
unwarranted (Rosenberg 2008, 177). It became clear that the Court’s ruling “did not end efforts to
limit the ease and availability of abortion” (Rosenberg 2008, 177). The Court’s ruling was not able
to produce lasting social change and thus confirmed for Rosenberg that Court decisions are not
dynamic in nature. Instead the Court’s decision resulted in political backlash and continued
constitutional debate on the issue of abortion.
Based on his findings in Roe, Rosenberg theorized that continued litigation in favor of
same-sex marriage would likely produce both state and federal backlash. Yet, I argue that in the
case of Obergefell, states were able to participate in the constitutional debate and experiment with
policy through diverse legal means to match regional values prior to the intervention of the Court.
This resulted in the increased public support for same-sex marriage overtime. Advocates for the
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legal recognition and equality of same-sex marriage made strategic use of the courts in order to
secure lasting social change. Once the issue reached the Supreme Court for their constitutional
interpretation, the majority of the country had been given sufficient time to grapple with the notion
of a right to same-sex marriage.
The difference between the Court leading the constitutional dialogue in Roe and responding
to it in Obergefell are relevant to this analysis by highlighting the importance of the state’s role in
constitutional debates and effective implementation of Court decisions. Ultimately, Roe was
unsuccessful at ending constitutional debates as it attempted to intervene before a majority of the
public supported liberalized abortion rights. Obergefell, however, was decided after a majority of
states and public opinion polls were in favor of adopting same-sex marriage rights, which I argue
will result in a more enduring social change.
The dependent variable of interest in this study is lasting social change. Lasting social
change is produced when a constitutional decision is handed down by the United States Supreme
Court with minimal to no backlash. For the purpose of this study, backlash is defined by any
continued political debate or state constitutional dialogue aimed at obstructing the implementation
of the Court’s decision or aimed at overturning the Court’s decision.
The main independent variable of interest in this study is issue percolation through the
democratic process in the states and across the country. When issues pertaining to rights percolate
in the states through the democratic process, the issue gains traction and over time trends develop
with growing public support and contribute to social change. State level change is an incremental
process where political change is aimed at shifting public sentiment to drive social change. Issue
percolation is then operationalized through state legislative change corresponding with shifts in
public opinion and majority state adoption of policy. This study is specifically concerned with the
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issue percolation regarding two iterations of substantive rights, abortion and same-sex marriage.
The issue of abortion did not have enough time to percolate in the states to develop favorable
trends when the Court ruled in Roe and got out in front of the issue leading policy change. The
issue of same-sex marriage, on the other hand, was seemingly given enough time to percolate and
develop favorable trends so that when the Court ruled in Obergefell it was jumping on the trend
and bring the outlier states along with it.
Along with issue percolation, this study will consider its interacting effect with public
opinion in producing lasting social change. When considering public opinion in this case I will
consider the public’s position in favor of or in opposition to the substantive right at issue. Here, I
will use data on the percentage of the public favorable to allowing for a right to abortion or samesex marriage compared to the percentage of the public opposed to either right. This may not be an
exhaustive explanation of social change, and there may be additional explanatory variables likely
to cause lasting social change. However, I am confident that those variables do not correlate with
the dependent variable in such a significant way to make the independent variables of interest in
this case the result of a spurious relationship. This understanding of social change is at least a
significant factor in the durability of Supreme Court precedent.
Based on Rosenberg’s findings, the Court is ineffective at producing social change. In the
case of Roe v. Wade (1973), the Court was counterproductive at contributing to lasting social
change because of decades of political backlash following the Court’s ruling. However, the case
of same-sex marriage and the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) may provide a
counterfactual. Comparing the two cases might help build a better understanding of how the Court
can play a role in creating lasting social change without creating such a backlash. In his study of
Roe and other cases, Rosenberg did not consider the role that constitutional debates outside of the
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Court, and especially in the states, might have played in helping an issue percolate and build
consensus in and amongst the states. When the Court took up the issue of abortion and decided
Roe, there hadn’t really been such developments in the states. The states have since continued to
pass legislation in an effort to further regulate abortion while pro-life groups have mobilized to
overturn the decision altogether. Yet, when the Court took up the issue of same-sex marriage and
decided Obergefell, the states had taken a significant amount of time to constitutionally debate the
legality of extending the right of marriage to same-sex couples and build a majority consensus
favorable of doing so. Ultimately, Roe was unsuccessful at ending constitutional debates as it
attempted to intervene before a majority of the public supported liberalized abortion rights.

CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS

Roe v. Wade

The issue of abortion through the landmark Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade (1973)
is the starting point of this study. The states began their political and constitutional debate
regarding abortion in the late 1960s. When the Court decided Roe and nationalized a right to
abortion a majority of the states had not yet liberalized their abortion laws. The Court halted the
political and constitutional deliberation in the states before there existed a majority consensus
regarding the issue of abortion. Had the Supreme Court not decided on the issue of abortion so
early and the states ensured the time to deal with the complex issues relating to a right to abortion,
a Court ruling on abortion would not have resulted in the same political backlash as Roe.
In 1973, the Burger Court handed down the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade. Jane Roe
petitioned the Court to challenge the constitutionality of a Texas criminal abortion statute. The
statute in question was enacted in 1854 and only allowed for abortion to save “the life of the
mother” (410 U.S. 113, 1973 at 119). Roe challenged the constitutionality of the statute for not
allowing her to receive a legal abortion because her life was not at risk as a violation to her right
to privacy, “protected by the First, Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments” (410 U.S. 113,
1973 at 120). Jane Roe went a step further by adding an amendment to her complaint stating that
her lawsuit was not only for herself but on behalf of “all other women” (410 U.S. 113, 197
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120). The Supreme Court was faced with the legal question: does the constitutional right to privacy
protect a woman’s choice to have an abortion?
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun found that Roe had standing to sue in this case
because though she was not pregnant at the time, she was unable to secure a legal abortion in Texas
and pregnancy is a condition “capable of repetition” (410 U.S. 113, 1973 at 125). The Court’s
decision began with a review of the then history of abortion regulation. Pursuant to common law,
abortion before "quickening” or “the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing
usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy” was viewed as less objectionable than
abortion after (410 U.S. 113, 1973 at 132). Additionally, three reasons were historically accepted
for the enactment of criminal abortion laws, and continue to justify legal bans on abortion: to
discourage illicit sex, the protection of women, and the protection of paternal life (410 U.S. 113,
1973 at 147-150). The first reason given was not disputed in Roe, the second interest had been
altered by modern medical practices, specifically relating to early pregnancy before the end of the
first trimester, and the third interest becomes more compelling as the pregnancy progresses.
Justice Blackmun then moved on to deal with the issue of privacy. The Court recognized
that the Constitution does not explicitly mention a fundamental right to privacy, but nonetheless
found that one exists. The Court further found that that right “is broad enough to encompass a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy” (410 U.S. 113, 1973 at 153).
Abortion rights, however, are not absolute. The state may continue to assert an interest in
protecting the health of the mother and the fetus, the interest becoming more compelling with the
progression of the pregnancy. The state’s interest regarding the health of the mother becomes
compelling “at approximately the end of the first trimester” (410 U.S. 113, 1973 at 163). The state
may not regulate an abortion decision prior to that point. The state’s interest regarding the potential
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life becomes compelling at the point of viability, or when the fetus has the capability of meaningful
life outside the mother's womb (410 U.S. 113, 1973 at 163). At the point of viability, the state may
go so far as to ban abortion altogether except in cases where it is necessary to protect the life or
health of the mother. Therefore, the Supreme Court struck down the Texas statute for violating the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Before Roe

Prior to the decision in Roe, the issue of abortion received some state and limited national
attention, for it was the Supreme Court’s action that made abortion a national public issue (Devins
1996, 56; Rosenberg 2008, 229). Connecticut was the first state to enact an antiabortion statute
and by 1880, with the aid of the American Medical Association (AMA), abortion became illegal
nationwide (Devins 1996, 57-58). The policy enacted by most states “banned abortion in all
circumstances, except when necessary to save the life of the mother” (Devins 1996, 58). Yet, the
decade before Roe, state activists and women’s rights groups began to call for the liberalization of
criminal abortion statutes. These political grassroots efforts began as a response to the 1962 Model
Penal Code which authorized “abortions when the health of the mother was endangered, when the
infant might be born with incapacitation physical or mental deformities, and when the pregnancy
was a result of rape or incest” (Devins 1996, 58). The AMA approved the Penal Code’s “limited
approval of abortion” and by the time Roe would be decided in 1973, “fourteen states had adopted
some version of the Model Penal Code’s abortion law, and four others had completely
decriminalized abortion” (Devins 1996,59). Public sentiments regarding a women’s ability to
obtain a legal abortion were subtly beginning to shift.
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In 1969, the California Supreme Court was the first Court to declare an abortion statute
unconstitutional in People v. Belous (Morgan 1979, 1748). In Belous, the California Court was
presented with the challenged constitutionality of a state criminal abortion law. The law was
originally enacted in 1850 and only allowed for abortions when necessary to “preserve” the life of
the mother (71 Cal.2d 954, 1969 at 959). The California Court rejected the interpretation of
"necessary to preserve" as “certainty or immediacy of death” in favor of the necessity that the
“dangerous condition be potentially present” (71 Cal.2d 954, 1969 at 963). Further, the California
Court stated that in following the path of the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), it
is a woman’s choice whether or not to bear a child. The Court ruled that though the law was lawful
when it was enacted in 1850, “constitutional concepts are not static” and the law is no longer valid
(71 Cal.2d 954, 1969 at 967). This ruling set the stage for nonrestrictive abortions before
“quickening” and by 1971, “the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
drafted a Uniform Abortion Act that would have placed no limitations on abortion during the first
twenty weeks of pregnancy” (Devins 1996, 58).
Even with these small victories, “many states rejected the Model Penal Code reform” (Devins
1996, 59). In reforming their abortion legislation, some states went so far as to impose “so many
restrictions that the number of legal abortions actually decreased” (Devins 1996, 59). Due to a lack
of response from state legislatures being unresponsive to abortion reform and from “relying on the
civil rights movement as an example of a successful use of the court to produce significant social
reform,” abortion advocates turned to the Supreme Court for a resolution (Keck 2014, 173;
Lemieux 2004; Rosenberg 2008, 173). To be effective, Court reforms require public support.
When the abortion issue reached the Supreme Court in 1973, many were under the illusion that
popular support was in favor of liberalizing abortion law (Rosenberg 2008, 182). In fact, at the
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time Roe was decided, abortion did have large scale support from professional elites, activists and
the public with 86 percent favoring a maternal health exception to abortion, 79 percent favoring a
rape exception and 57 percent favoring to decriminalizing abortion altogether (Keck 2014, 173;
Rosenberg 2008, 182). Public litigation of the abortion issue had the effect of placing the issue of
abortion on the nation’s political agenda (Rosenberg 2008, 174). However, publicity also altered
the public perception of the issue, giving rise to the pro-life movement and its efforts to overturn
the Court’s decision, which persists even today, some 44 years later.

After Roe

In deciding Roe v. Wade (1973), the Court did not necessarily stop the democratic debate
on the abortion issue. Rather, the Court handed down a less than enduring decision that has
continually been revisited and revised due to the constitutional debate to which it facilitated. In
1973, “the political process in many states had yet to decide on abortion” (Morgan 1979, 1726).
Following the Court’s decision in Roe, those opposed to abortion turned to the political institutions
and relied upon legislative strategies to regulate and restrict abortions, while pro-choice advocates
turned to the courts to veto these new and unwanted restrictions on their right to seek an abortion
(Keck 2014, 68, 81). The Court unknowingly started a constitutional dialogue between state
legislative institutions and the Court itself. In the year following Roe, the pro-life movement began
to grow and chip away the Court’s ruling by introducing 260 bills in state legislatures, thirty-one
of which were eventually enacted with the sole purpose of “restricting abortion rights” (Devins
1996, 60). State political action, post-Roe, was more concerned with undermining the Court’s
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ruling than it was concerned with enhancing the protection of an individual liberty and a woman’s
right to abortion.
After sixteen years of constitutional volleying between state legislators and the Supreme
Court, states were recognized to have broad authority to regulate abortion through the allocation
of state funds (Devins 1996, 63). In the case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989),
the Court was confronted with a Missouri law restricting “the use of public funds, employees, or
facilities for the purpose of ‘encouraging or counseling’ a woman to have an abortion not necessary
to save her life” (492 U.S. 490, 1989 at 501). The law further contained the requirement that
doctors perform tests to determine fetal viability after 20 weeks. The Court stated in its majority
opinion that the Missouri law did not burden a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion in its
restrictions of public funds, employees, and facilities. The Court also found that the viability test
requirement served as a legitimate state interest “sufficient to sustain its constitutionality” which
in future cases would require the Court to “modify and narrow Roe” (492 U.S. 490, 1989 at 520,
521). The Court’s decision in Webster signified the Court’s willingness to “shake the doctrinal
foundation of Roe” but further “encouraged state legislative responses to its decision” (Devins
1996, 66). While some viewed the decision in Webster as the beginning of the end for Roe, polls
showed increased support for abortion rights with 57 percent of Americans opposed to Webster,
61 percent in agreement with Roe v. Wade, and 70 percent being opposed to a constitutional
amendment banning abortions altogether (Devins 1996, 68).
With the decision in Webster, the Court transferred the constitutional debate back upon the
states, which required state legislatures to meet pro-life and pro-choice organizations head-on. For
the short term, state legislatures realized that any kind of abortion victory would be a result of
policy reform at the state legislative level (Devins 1996, 71). Nearly two decades following the
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Courts ruling in Roe, the Court would be provided with its first opportunity to overturn Roe. At
issue in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) were five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act of 1982. The provisions at issue included informed consent, spousal notification,
parental consent, a medical emergency exception and reporting requirements upon facilities
providing abortions. The Court upheld the central holding in Roe, reiterating that women have a
right to receive an abortion prior to fetal viability, that the state may regulate abortion post-viability
except when a mother’s life or health are at risk, and the state maintains an interest in protecting
the life and health of the mother and unborn fetus.
The Court did, however, reject the rigid trimester framework, which was not considered to
be part of the central holding of Roe. The Court stated that the trimester framework was rejected
because it suffered from the basic flaws of misconceiving “the nature of the pregnant woman’s
interest; and in practice it undervalues the State's interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe”
(505 U.S. 833, 1992 873). In justifying the rejection of the trimester framework, the Court further
stated that “not every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an
infringement of that right” (505 U.S. 833, 1992 873). With this statement, the Court afforded the
states substantial flexibility in protecting its interest when regulating abortion, but warned that
state regulation is not limitless. Once “state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's
ability to make this decision” does the state infringe upon the “liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause” (505 U.S. 833, 1992 874). The Court clarified that an undue burden is shorthand for the
government “placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus” (505 U.S. 833, 1992 877). Applying the new standard of review, the Court struck
down the spousal notification provision of the Pennsylvania Act as a substantial obstacle for a
woman seeking an abortion, upholding the remaining provisions of the Act.
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The decision in Casey was an unsatisfying win for the pro-life movement. Though the
Court ruled in favor of the state’s broad interest in regulating abortion for the health and safety of
both the mother and fetus, the Court also reaffirmed the central holding in Roe. The Court’s
intermediate ruling in Casey even matched public sentiment, with sixty percent of voters
supporting the Pennsylvania law (Devins 1996, 74). For two years after Casey, “no legislation was
introduced to outlaw abortion,” one-third of state abortion legislation guaranteed the right to
abortion and any state regulation on abortion passed the Courts standard for approval (Devins
1996, 74). However, these victories for the pro-choice movement following Casey did not end the
political struggle by the pro-life movement in their continued attempt to overturn Roe.
The Supreme Court was again confronted with the issue of abortion rights in Stenberg v.
Carhart (2000). At issue in the case was a Nebraska law criminalizing partial-birth abortions. The
Court struck down the law for violating the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Writing for
the majority, Justice Breyer first struck down the law for unconstitutionally denying a health
exception, post-viability, for the mother. Justice Breyer further stated, citing Casey, that the
Nebraska law placed an undue burden on a women’s right to choose abortion for the fear of
“prosecution, conviction and imprisonment” (530 U.S. 914, 2000 at 946). The Court later upheld
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 in Gonzales v. Carhart (2007). The Court rejected the
claim that the Act’s purpose was “to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion” (550 U.S. 124, 2007). Rather, the Court found that the “Act’s ban on abortions that
involve partial delivery of a living fetus furthers the Government's objectives” (550 U.S. 124,
2007). The Court further distinguished its decision in Gonzales from its decision in Sternberg by
stating that the Nebraska law was vague in relation to its federal predecessor.
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In a further response to the viability issue, 26 states enacted compulsory ultrasound laws,
requiring women to undergo an ultrasound before receiving an abortion. Such a law was upheld in
Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey (2012) while conversely struck
down in Pruitt v. Nova Health Systems (2012). With the states as laboratories of democracy
experimenting with policy and lower-courts establishing their own case law on this issue, it would
seem only a matter of time before the constitutional debate again reached the Supreme Court.
After 44 years of state and Supreme Court constitutional dialogue regarding the issue of
abortion, the Court was again faced with the issue in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016).
The Court had to “decide whether two provisions of Texas' House Bill 2 violate the Federal
Constitution as interpreted in Casey” (136 S.Ct. 2292, 2016 at 2300). The two provisions at issue
were an admitting-privileges requirement and a surgical-center requirement, both of which the
Court struck down for placing an undue burden on a women’s ability to obtain an abortion.
According to the respondent’s briefs, “the purpose of the admitting-privileges requirement is to
help ensure that women have easy access to a hospital should complications arise during an
abortion procedure” (136 S.Ct. 2292, 2016 at 2311). Yet, following the passage of the state
requirement, a total of nineteen abortion clinics closed and doctors were unable “to obtain
admitting privileges at nearby hospitals” as there had never before been a need (136 S.Ct. 2292,
2016 at 2312). The surgical-center requirement placed an additional need to meet the "minimum
standards ... for ambulatory surgical centers" upon abortion facilities (136 S.Ct. 2292, 2016 at
2314). These requirements ranged from the size of the medical staff to that of the building
requirements. It was found, however, that such requirements added no further benefit to the safety
and health of those women seeking an abortion. Therefore, the Court concluded that each
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requirement of the Texas law posed a “substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions, and
constitutes an "undue burden" on their constitutional right to do so” (136 S.Ct. 2292, 2016 at 2318).
The decision in Hellerstedt might be considered the most significant in abortion rights
cases since Casey. The Court once again reaffirmed the central holding in Roe, and also continued
to uphold the undue burden standard in Casey. Roe v. Wade has been criticized as one of the
Court’s most activist rulings regarding a substantive right, and has resulted in substantial backlash.
While it is true that the Court’s decision did not produce rapid change in favor of abortion, public
opinion has remained consistent over time supporting abortion when a mother’s life is at risk, there
is risk of “serious fetal defect” or the result of rape (Rosenberg 2008, 188). Following Roe, the
states played a prominent role in shaping the debate on abortion rights, along with the courts.
“Consistent with the expectations of federalism, diverse policies were developed after Roe, that
reflected local political and cultural factors,” while the Court in turn responded to state efforts to
regulate abortion (Devins 1996, 76). By the Court reaching out to decide on the issue of abortion,
“it is undeniable that Roe transformed the states and that the states transformed Roe” (Devins 1996,
77). The Court began a constitutional debate that continues to persist decades later and should
serve as a reminder that quick resolutions are not always the most effective path to produce lasting
social change (Morgan 1979, 1748).

Obergefell v. Hodges

This issue of same-sex marriage through the landmark Supreme Court decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) is used as the counterfactual for this study. The states had roughly
twenty years to experiment with laws and regulations prior to the Supreme Court nationalizing a
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right to same-sex marriage. By the time of the decision in 2015, 36 states had legalized same-sex
marriage and 55% of the public favored extending legal recognition of marriage to same-sex
couples. This case is not the same as in the case of Roe and the right to abortion. The states had
the time to politically and constitutionally debate the complex issues regarding a right to same-sex
marriage before the Supreme Court ruled, which had not occurred in the case of Roe. By the issue
of same-sex marriage having the time to percolate in the states, a majority consensus regarding the
issue was developed and backlash to the Court’s decision is unlikely to result.
The Constitution is explicitly silent regarding the issue of marriage. 1 Yet in 2015, the
Roberts Court was presented with the issue of same-sex marriage and its constitutionality. The
states of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee defined marriage to be between one man and
one woman. As a result, 14 same-sex couples from those states petitioned the Court to review their
states denying them not only their right to marry but whether their marriage would be legally
recognized outside their respective states. This class action lawsuit presented the Court with two
constitutional questions: “whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a
marriage between two people of the same sex” (576 U.S. __ 2015, 3) and “whether the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a State to recognize same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a State
which does grant that right” (576 U.S. __ 2015, 4).
Authoring the majoring opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy stated that “the history of
marriage is one of both continuity and change” (576 U.S. __ 2015, 6). Therefore, pursuant to their
institutional obligation to interpret the Constitution, it was the duty of the Court to identify and

The Supreme Court ruled in Loving v. Virginia (1973) that “the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” (388 U.S. 1 1967, 12). The Court
held unanimously that miscegenation statues unconstitutionally violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and deprive individuals of liberty without the due process of law. The decision in Loving set the precedent
that marriage is a fundamental right.
1
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further protect fundamental rights. The identification of such newfound rights, which had
previously been overlooked in our history as a nation and construction of constitutional law, is
achieved through reasoned judgement, as opposed to personal motives (576 U.S. __ 2015, 10-11).
The states, having participated in extensive debate and litigation have enhanced the understanding
of the issue. The states found themselves at a constitutional impasse and it was the Court’s time to
debate its constitutionality. Kennedy identified four distinct principles related to a fundamental
right to same-sex marriage including individual autonomy, the importance of the commitment
between two-individuals, safeguard for children and families, and marriage as a “keystone of social
order” (576 U.S. ___ 2015, 16). These principles and the states’ vested interest in protecting the
institution of marriage establish the fact that the Constitution protects the individual’s right to
marry. Therefore, the Court recognized a right to marry for all same-sex couples, in all states,
pursuant to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Before Obergefell

Unlike the abortion issue, which took a top-down approach in its constitutional dialogue,
the same-sex marriage issue opted for a bottom-up approach relying on state governing institutions
and state courts. Gay rights groups and activists relied on the state’s ability to protect their rights
and liberties at a higher level than that of the federal government “until the combination of public
support and legal precedent marked out a clear path to victory” (Keck 2014, 19). Gay rights
advocates began their political journey towards marriage equality in the 1970s, bringing suit in
Minnesota, Kentucky and Washington (Rosenberg 2008, 342). The Minnesota Supreme Court in
Baker v. Nelson (1971) upheld a state law limiting marriage to persons of the opposite sex, for it
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was not in violation of the U.S. Constitution. The Kentucky Court of Appeals denied a same-sex
couple the right to marry in Jones v. Hallahan (1973) because the dictionary defined marriage as
being between a man and a woman, and the Washington Appellate Court affirmed a lower court’s
decision denying two men a marriage license, in Singer v. Hara (1974). These early legal defeats
are a reminder that constitutional interpretation and dialogue is not a static process and requires
time to shape and mold political opinion in a favorable direction when lasting social change is the
desired end.
The earliest poll regarding public opinion and the right of same-sex couples right to marry
completed “in 1988 by the National Opinion Research Center” (Rosenberg 2008, 400).
Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a right to same-sex marriage; 12
percent agreed and 73 percent disagreed (Rosenberg 2008, 400-401). In the years following, public
opinion on same-sex marriages began to shift in a positive direction and same-sex marriage
advocates finally achieved some success in 1993. The Hawaii State Supreme Court ruled in Baehr
v. Miller (1993) that absent a compelling state interest in denying same-sex couples the right to
marry, such action violated the state constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. In 1993, several
months before the ruling in Baehr, public support for same-sex marriage had increased to 27
percent, with 65 percent against extending the right (Rosenberg 2008, 401). While the Hawaii high
court ruling appeared to be a success for states’ rights advocates, the constitutional debate would
soon shift to the federal government, placing an obstacle in the movements path.
In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in response to the ruling
in Baehr. DOMA defined marriage to be between one man and one woman. This federal law
allowed states the ability to deny recognition of same-sex unions under other state laws. This
interpretation of marriage further denied same-sex couples federal recognition interpreting
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marriage in this manner, same-sex couple’s marriage was further denied federal recognition and
protection of marital unions while simultaneously advancing the heteronormative objective. Samesex marriage advocates again turned back to state governing institutions to further their cause, for
they were viewed as more hospitable than the federal government (Keck 2014, 36). Though
numerous states followed the example of the federal government and enacted mini-DOMAs, even
going so far as to amend state constitutions to define marriage as between a man and a woman, the
California legislature “extended legal recognition to same-sex couples” in 1999 (Franklin 2014,
845; Keck 2014, 79). “Over the next fourteen years” 15 other state legislatures would go onto
expand their marriage rights to include same-sex couples (Keck 2014, 79).
Seven years after DOMA was enacted at the federal level, the right to same-sex marriage
moved forward as state high courts struck down legislation for unconstitutionally denying samesex couples an equal right to marriage. In the case of Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health (2003),
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that denying same-sex couples the right to
marry violated the Massachusetts Constitution right of equal protection. The majority opinion
further recognized, as Justice Brennan previously had, that state constitutions are better at
protecting individual liberty than that of the federal constitution. Massachusetts issued its first
same-sex marriage license in 2004. Additionally, according to a poll conducted by the Pew
Research Center, public support for same-sex marriage rose to 30 percent, with 62 percent opposed
by November 2003 (Rosenberg 2008, 403). The Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled in Kerrigan
v. Commissioner of Public Health (2008), that denying same-sex couples the right to marry
violated the right to equality and liberty guaranteed in the Connecticut Constitution. The Iowa
Supreme Court, in Varnum v. Brien (2009), found that the state limitation of marriage to opposite
sex couples violated the equal protection clause of the state constitution. The Iowa court again

took Brennan’s advice, relying upon the decisions in Romar v. Evans

(1996)2
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and Lawrence v.

Texas (2003)3, to demonstrate orientation based discrimination but rested its decisions solely on
the basis of state constitutional law.4
This is not to say that same-sex marriage rights advocates were not met with resistance
from opponents, for some of “the most well-known antigay policies have been enacted directly by
the voters” (Keck 2014, 38). Between 1995 and 2000, thirty-two states passed legislation banning
same-sex marriage and in 2004, eleven states voted and approved constitutional amendments
banning same-sex marriage (Rosenberg 2008, 357). Yet, by May 2006, according to a poll
conducted by the Gallup organization, 39 percent of respondents favored legal recognition of
same-sex marriages, opposed to 58 percent that did not; that is an increase of 27 percentage points
since 1988 (Rosenberg 2008, 403). In 2008, the California Supreme Court “became the second
state high court to order full marriage equality” and the first to afford strict scrutiny in cases
regarding sexual orientation and the limiting of marriage to opposite sex couples (Keck 2014, 52).
In re Marriage Cases (2008), the California high court found marriage to be a fundamental right,
afforded to all persons regardless of sexual orientation, pursuant to Article 1, Section 7 of the
California Constitution. However, this decision was rendered moot by the passage of Proposition

2

Romer v. Evans (1996) was the first Supreme Court case to deal with the issue of gay civil rights since Bowers v.
Hardwick (1986) which criminalized homosexual sodomy. At issue in Evans was a Colorado state constitutional
amendment which prevented the state from recognizing sexual orientation as a protected class legally protected from
discrimination. The Supreme Court struck down the Colorado Amendment for violating the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3

The Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) struck down a Texas sodomy law for violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. The holding not only struck down 13 state sodomy laws but also overturned Bowers v. Hardwick (1986).
4

Historically, sexual orientation has not always been considered a suspect class likely to be discriminated against.
Therefore, any cases presented before the Court were not afforded strict scrutiny, the most rigid level of judicial
review. In order to demonstrate orientation based discrimination it must be established that the group “has suffered a
history of discrimination…that those stereotypes no longer constitute legitimate ground for state action” (Franklin
2014, 851-52).
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8; a state constitutional amendment, passed by popular vote, making same-sex marriage illegal by
defining marriage to be only between a man and a woman. Though Proposition 8 was initially
affirmed as constitutional by the California Supreme Court in Strauss v. Horton (2009), it would
eventually be struck down. In the case of Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013), the Supreme Court upheld
the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and found Proposition 8 to be
unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals ruling found that the state constitutional amendment had
no relevant purpose other than to advance the position of heteronormativity as superior to that of
homosexuality.
At the same time, the states experimented with different levels of legal recognition afforded
to same-sex couples, ranging from domestic partnerships to civil unions, gay rights activists began
to set their sights higher. Same-sex marriage and gay rights activists were strategic in their use of
litigation, doing so mainly where they perceived a win possible. By 2013, according to the Pew
Research Center, 50 percent of Americans favored a right to same-sex marriage and 43 percent
opposed the right. No longer satisfied with second class government-sanctioned partnerships,
same-sex marriage advocates sought a nationalized fundamental right to marriage. To achieve this,
they were willing to transfer the constitutional debate from the states back to the federal courts. In
the landmark decision of United States v. Windsor (2013), the Supreme Court struck down Section
3 of DOMA as unconstitutional. Section 3 of DOMA denied same-sex couples, legally married at
the state level, to be recognized and protected by the federal government.
Authoring the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that “by history and tradition the
definition and regulation of marriage…has been treated as being within the authority and realm of
the separate states” (570 U.S. ___ 2013, 2690). A federal definition of marriage as between one
man and one woman therein violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Kennedy
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further stated that though marriage laws vary from state to state, it has long been the general rule
that states are afforded with the privilege to regulate domestic relationships within their borders,
with the capacity to incorporate new insights, without the watchful burden of the federal
government. While federal courts refrain from adjudicating in the realm of marriage law out of
respect to this traditional area of state regulation, Congress in enacting DOMA sought to regulate
the definition of marriage in order to further some federal objective. Therefore, the Court struck
down Section 3 as an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment
(570 U.S. ___ 2013, 2695). Following the decision in Windsor, it was assumed only a matter of
time before the Supreme Court made a ruling in favor of a national legal recognition of same-sex
marriage.
By the time the constitutional question regarding a right to same-sex marriage reached the
Supreme Court for review, the states had played a dominant role in the constitutional debate and
shaping public opinion regarding the issue. When Obergefell was decided in 2015, 36 states and
the District of Columbia had already legally recognized, in some form or another, same-sex
partnerships; those 13 states remaining being the outliers. Also, according to the Pew Research
Center, in 2015, 55 percent of the of Americans favored legal recognition of same-sex marriage
and 39 percent opposed. Though Obergefell has been criticized as an activist judicial decision, for
nationalizing an issue previously accepted as within the domain of the states, some state
legislatures have responded to the decision by passing religious exception laws, it has not been
met with the same backlash as Roe.5

5

According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, as of 2015, 21 states had enacted Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts (RFRAs) to protect the free exercise of religion void of government interference.
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Trends in Roe and Obergefell

The states began their campaign against bans on abortion in the late 1960s. During this
narrow span of time before the Court decided Roe, Hawaii, Alaska, Washington and New York
repealed their state anti-abortion laws. 13 additional states liberalized their abortion laws to allow
for abortions when the life or health of the mother was at risk. However, a majority of the states
maintained their stance that abortion was illegal in all cases. Due to the Court’s interception of the
abortion issue in 1973, public support for the decision in Roe v. Wade and public opinion regarding
abortion remained divided. Overtime, the Court has gradually allowed the states to impose further
restrictions on abortion, in essence enhancing the polarized public views of abortion. This is likely
the result of the Supreme Court positioning itself in front of the democratic process and
nationalizing a right to abortion before the issue could properly permeate in and among the states.
Public support for the Court’s ruling in Roe has varied over the years. According to the
Harris Poll (Table 1), between 1973 when Roe was decided and 2006, support for this landmark
Court ruling has ranged from 49% to 65%. There was an initial spike in public approval following
the decision with 52% favorable towards the ruling and 42% opposed to it. Public support remained
favorable towards Roe until 1992 when the Court reaffirmed Roe’s central holding in Casey. At
the time Casey was decided, 61% of the public supported the Court’s ruling in Roe while 35% of
the public were opposed to it. The ruling in Casey, however, signaled to the states that they could
enact restrictions on the availability of abortions so long as they did not create an undue burden.
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As a result, public approval for Roe declined steadily over the next 14 years. This resulted in public
support for Roe being greatly divided in 2006, with approval at 49% and opposition at 47%.

Table 1
Public Opinion on Roe v. Wade: 1973-2006
Year
1973
1976
1979
1981
1985
1989
1991
1992
1993
1996
1998
2005
2006

Favor Roe
52%
59%
60%
56%
50%
59%
65%
61%
56%
52%
57%
52%
49%

Oppose Roe
42%
28%
37%
41%
47%
37%
33%
35%
42%
41%
41%
47%
47%

*Source: (The Harris Poll, 2006)

Public opinion regarding a women’s legal right to abortion has remained divided since Roe.
Based on a survey conducted by Pew Research Center, following the Court’s landmark ruling in
Casey, public opinion in favor of abortion has maintained a majority, though the exact rate of
support has been somewhat inconsistent. Table 2 shows the results of the Pew survey. The rate of
the public favoring a legal right to abortion in all or most cases has varied from 60% approval in
1995, falling to 47% approval in 2009 and then returning to 57% approval in 2016. This
inconsistency in public support for abortion is due to the publics tendency to distinguish between
“the right to abortion under one circumstance versus another” due to its underlying moral
implications (Shaw 2003, 407). By distinguishing when and under what circumstances abortion is
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appropriate, the public is both able “to support a right to abortion while also supporting limits on”
a woman’s access to it (Shaw 2003, 407). As a result, public opinion on abortion has not only
continued to be divided but also inconsistent over the years.
Table 2
Public Opinion on Abortion Following Casey: 1995-2016
Year

Favor Legalized Abortion

1995
1996
1998
1999
2000
2001
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

60%
57%
54%
56%
53%
54%
57%
55%
57%
51%
52%
54%
47%
50%
53%
54%
54%
55%
51%
57%

*Source: (Pew Research Center, 2017)

Oppose Legalized
Abortion
38%
40%
42%
42%
43%
43%
42%
43%
41%
43%
42%
40%
44%
44%
42%
39%
40%
40%
43%
39%
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As the public continues to debate when abortion is most appropriate, the states have
responded by enacting legislation with the purpose of restricting abortions. According to the
Guttmacher Institute, states have enacted legislation placing bans on partial birth abortions,
enacted compulsory ultrasound laws, as well as mandated both counseling and waiting periods.
These findings are found in Table 3. Those states with bans on partial birth abortions ban the
procedure under all circumstances in all states except Georgia, Montana, and New Mexico. These
three states only ban the procedure post-viability. Most states have also begun to restrict abortions
starting at 20 weeks, ranging until the third trimester. These restrictions on abortion, however, are
not absolute. Most states allow for an exception in cases where the health and/or life of the mother
is at risk. Yet, some states have gone so far as to enact legislation that is not enforceable under Roe
standards. These states regulations further indicate the trend that the public at large continues to
be divided regarding when a legal right to abortion is sufficient.
Since the late 1960s, up to present day, the number of legally induced abortions has
fluctuated. According to Johnston’s Archive, presented in Table 4, the number of legal abortions
reported began to increase in the late 1960s and early 1970s as states began to liberalize their
abortion laws. The number of legal abortions reported continued to increase following the Court’s
decision in Roe. However, the number of legal abortions leveled off in the 1980s and has continued
to decrease in the 1990s and throughout the 2000s.
While public support for abortion remains divided decades after Roe, public support for
same-sex marriage has increased overtime leading up to the decision in Obergefell. The states
began their campaign for same-sex marriage in the mid-1990s. During this time the states were
allowed the democratic freedom to experiment with policy and law before the Court decided
Obergefell in 2015. The issue of same-sex marriage was left to percolate in the states for a longer

Table 3
State Abortion Laws

Ban on Partial Birth Abortion

19 states: Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia

Compulsory Ultrasound

26 states: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wisconsin

Mandated Counseling

17 states: Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, West Virginia

Waiting Period

27 states: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin

*Source: (Guttmacher Institute, 2017)
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Table 4
Number of Legal Abortions Reported 1965-2016
Year
1965
1969
1973
1976
1979
1984
1989
1992
1997
2000
2005
2010
2016

Abortions Reported
749
27,512
744,610
1,179,300
1,497,670
1,577,180
1,566,870
1,528,930
1,335,000
1,313,000
1,206,200
871,053
77,983

*Source: (Johnston Archive, 2017)

period of time than in Roe which resulted in a steady trend of increased public support for samesex marriage and an increase in the total number of same-sex marriages following the Court’s
decision. This is likely the result of the Court deciding the issue at a later point in the democratic
debate and following the already established favorable opinion of the states.
According to Pew Research Center, as shown in Table 5, public opinion in favor of samesex marriage grew steadily overtime. As seen in conjunction with Table 6, based on a survey
conducted by Pew Research Center, by 2001 states had moved on from enacting statutory bans on
same-sex marriage to enacting constitutional bans.6 In 2001 only 35% of the public favored a legal
recognition of same-sex marriages while 57% of the public continued to oppose it. Overtime, as
the states began to experiment with policy, including some states adopting some form of legal

6

Based on the hierarchy of laws constitutional provisions have supremacy over statutory laws. Additionally, the
process for changing constitutional provisions is more difficult than statutory laws.
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Table 5
Public Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage: 2001-2016
Year

Favor Legalization

2001
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

35%
32%
31%
36%
35%
37%
39%
37%
42%
46%
48%
50%
52%
55%
55%

Oppose
Legalization
57%
59%
60%
53%
55%
54%
51%
54%
48%
45%
43%
43%
40%
39%
37%

*Source: (Pew Research Center, 2016)

recognition of their unions, public support steadily grew. By 2013, the same year the Supreme
Court overturned DOMA, support for legally recognizing a right to same-sex marriage was up
15%. Public support for same-sex marriage was now at 50% and 43% of the public remained
opposed. By the time the Court decided Obergefell, not only had 36 states and the District of
Columbia legally recognize same-sex marriage but 55% of the public favored legalization with
only 39% of the public opposed. Public support for the legal right to same-sex marriage remained
consistent following the Court’s decision in Obergefell. This is likely due to the fact that the Court
joined the trend in terms of national sentiments regarding the issue rather than altering its direction.
When the Court nationalized a right to same-sex marriage in its landmark decision
Obergefell v. Hodges in June 2015, only 13 states had yet to legally recognize a right to same-sex

Table 6
State Laws on Same-Sex Marriage 1995-2015

Statutory Ban 1995-2000

Constitutional Ban 1998-2008

Legalization of Same-Sex
Marriage 2003-2015

40 states: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming
29 states: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin
36 states: Alabama Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin Wyoming

*Source: (Pew Research Center, 2015)
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marriage. Since the Court’s ruling the number of same-sex marriages has increased in those states
that had not legally recognized same-sex marriage. The number of same-sex marriages has also
increased in those states that had already legally recognized these unions. According to Gallup, as
seen in Table 7, one year following the decision in Obergefell, same-sex marriages in those 13
states increased by 13% compared to the 10% increase in those states that had already legally
recognized same-sex marriages. Nationally, same-sex marriages increased by 11% in the year
following the ruling in Obergefell.
Table 7
Change in Percentage of Same-sex Marriage Pre and Post Obergefell
Legal status
States where same-sex
marriage was not legal

pre-Obergefell

post-Obergefell

26%

39%

States where same-sex
marriage was legal

42%

52%

Nationally

38%

49%

*Source: (Gallup, Inc., 2016)

Since the Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade (1973), a majority of the public supports the
decision and the right to abortion in some or all cases. However, public approval has not been
consistent overtime. The number of legally reported abortions has likewise varied and most
recently decreased significantly. While this may partially be due to the advancements in
preventative measures, it is also likely associated with the recent trend in the states enacting policy
restricting abortion. The one thing that states have consistently shown consensus on regarding
abortion has been that the procedure is necessary when the health and/or life of the mother is at
risk. Trends regarding the right to same-sex marriage show a different picture. Public support for
the right to same-sex marriage steadily increased over time. This resulted in not only the states
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taking steps to legally recognize same-sex unions, but also the Supreme Court to nationalizing it.
Following the Court’s decision, public opinion on same-sex marriage has remained consistent and
same-sex marriages have increased nationally.
Moving forward it is likely that these trends will continue. In the case of abortion, the
majority will continue to favor a right to abortion in cases where the health and/or life of the mother
is at risk. States, however, will also continue to enact policy to restrict the right to abortion which
will likely result in a continued decrease in the number of legal abortions due to increases barriers
to access of the procedure. On the other hand, support for same-sex marriage will likely continue
to trend in the positive direction of favorability and the number of same-sex marriages will
continue to grow.

CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

Gerald Rosenberg argued that the Courts ability to produce social change is limited in
scope and found that due to the Court’s institutional constrains, Courts are “virtually powerless to
produce change” (Rosenberg 2008, 420). His theory, however, focuses on the national government
and does not address state level politics. Even if the Courts are incapable of producing social
change based on their own institutional merit, the focus for producing change should not center on
the national government. Consideration should also be afforded to the states and the political
developments made by grassroots efforts to produce social change.
The right to abortion and same-sex marriage are both issues that are traditionally regulated
by the states. These cases also encompass complex issues requiring political and public debate to
sort out their intricacies. In the case of abortion, the states had begun a political debate aimed at
allowing a right to abortion under certain conditions. Between the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
states began to unpack the medical and moral issues related to a right to abortion. The landmark
Court decision of Roe v. Wade (1973), however, ended that political debate in the states not long
after the discussion first began. This resulted in a battle over abortion regulation between the states
and the Courts as new issues relating to abortion continued to arise. Such issues included relation
to when and under what conditions abortion services are most appropriate, leaving the public
divided. Medical advances related to abortion have also introduced the issues of partial-birth
abortions and fetal imagining such as ultrasounds. As a result, states began enacting regulatory
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legislation and have continued to push the issue of abortion upon the Court. The Court continues
to review legislation to ensure that state regulation does not violate the standards set in Roe and
Casey. Anti-abortion groups hope that cases brought before the Court may one day lead to the
overturning of Roe.
In the case of same-sex marriage, the states also had complex issues to workout. Most of
the states struggled with the level of legal recognition to afford same-sex couples. While many
states had either enacted legislation or constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage,
they also experimented with other variations of legal recognition. Some states afforded same-sex
couples domestic partnerships, which provided limited rights associated to marriage. Other states
afforded these couples civil unions which provide a level of legal recognition similar to marriage
and was viewed as a first step towards legalizing a right to same-sex marriage. Overtime, as the
political debate regarding same-sex marriage evolved, states began to extend same-sex couples the
legal recognition, right and benefits of marriage. The political debate in the states, as well as policy
and legal experimentation, helped to sort out the issue of same-sex marriage. The states as active
participants in this political debate also helped form a public consensus in favor of affording samesex couples with the legal right to marry. By the time the Court handed down their landmark
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the Court was only joining that political and public
consensus rather than altering its course.
When the Court hands down a landmark decision after the political discussion has already
occurred, it has the capacity to create lasting change. When issues concerning new substantive
rights arise and remain in the states to percolate, the evolution of the political debate over time
aids in sorting out complex issues regarding the right and increases the level of public opinion in
favor of it. In these cases, by the time the Court constitutionally rules upon the right at issue the
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majority of the states and the public will already be behind the decision. The states would then
effectively be working with the Court to produce the desired change rather than the states working
in conflict with the Court. While I cannot say with absolute certainty that Obergefell will not be
met with the same backlash as Roe, the findings suggest that there exists a stable consensus in
favor of same-sex marriage, both at the state and individual level. The decision in Roe is still being
contested 44 years later and the right to abortion continues to struggle in maintaining a stable
majority of public favor. The decision in Obergefell, however, has largely been accepted as a
settled issue and is unlikely to be contested.
Today’s political climate is divided. American politics at both the state and national level
are polarized. This has resulted in roughly half of the public wanting to return to the roots of limited
government and state control of the protection of certain rights and liberties. The other segment of
the public wants the federal government to continue to regulate and mandate upon the states the
protection of certain rights and liberties. President Trump has stated that while he considers the
issue of same-sex marriage to be settled, he considers abortion to still be a contested issue. Trump
has stated that he would allow the states the ability to ban abortion in all cases except for rape,
incest or when the health of the mother is at risk. In an effort to accomplish this objective, Trump
has stated that he will aim to appoint justices to the Supreme Court that are pro-life and willing to
overturn Roe. However, the Supreme Court is unlikely to overturn either the decision in Roe or
Obergefell without an extreme ideological shift on the bench. Neil Gorsuch, Trump’s Supreme
Court nominee to fill the seat of Antonia Scalia, while ideologically conservative, will not have
the effect of producing the necessary ideological shift on the bench. Rather, Gorsuch’s
appointment would simply maintain the ideological ratio of the Supreme Court. Additionally,
Gorsuch has not explicitly stated a position on abortion or same-sex marriage. Until Gorsuch is
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confirmed by Congress and takes his seat on the bench of the Supreme Court, it is unclear the fate
of abortion or same-sex marriage. It is likely, however, that the right of abortion will likely remain
a contested issue between the states and the Court, while same-sex marriage will endure as an
established right

WORKS CITED
Baehr v. Miller, 910 P.2d 112, 80 Haw. 341 (1996).
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 291 Minn. 310, 291 Minn. 2d 310 (1971).
Becker, T. L. (Ed.). (1969). The impact of Supreme Court decisions. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Bickel, Alexander M. 1955. “The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision.”
Harvard Law Review 69: 1-65.
Bickel, Alexander M. 1986. The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics, 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Bork, Robert. 1990. The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law.
London: Sinclair-Stevenson.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 92 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1986).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1997).
Cooke, Jacob E. 1961. The Federalist (349). Edited by James E. Cooke. Middletown, CT:
Wesleyan University Press.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401, 3 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1958).
David, Gregory B. 2004. “Dworkin, Precedent, Confidence, and Roe V. Wade.” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 152: 1221-1253.
Devins, Neal. 1996. Shaping Constitutional Values: Elected Government, the Supreme Court,
and the Abortion Debate. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Epstein, Lee, and Thomas G. Walker. Constitutional Law for a Changing America. 8th ed.
Washington, DC: Sage, 2014. Print.
Fisher, Louis. 1985. “Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress.” North Carolina
Law Review 63: 707-747.

Fornieri, Joseph R. 2014. Abraham Lincoln, Philosopher Statesman. N.p.: Southern Illinois
University Press.

56

Franklin, Cary. 2014. “Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights.”
Virginia Law Review 100(5).
Gallup, Inc. 2016. “Same-Sex Marriages Up One Year After Supreme Court Verdict.” Retrieved
from http://www.gallup.com/poll/193055/sex-marriages-one-year-supreme-courtverdict.aspx
George, Tracey E. and Lee Epstein. 1992. “On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making.”
The American Political Science Review 86 (June): 323-337.
Ginsburg, Ruth Bader. 1992. “Speaking in a Judicial Voice.” New York University Law Review
67: 1198-1209.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 550 U.S. 124, 167 L. Ed. 2d 480 (2007).
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941, 798 N.E. 941
(2003).
Griffin, Johnathan. 2015, September 3. “2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation.”
Retrieved from http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state-rfralegislation.aspx
Guttmacher Institute. 2017. “An Overview of Abortion Laws.”
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws
Guttmacher Institute. 2017. “Requirements for Ultrasound.” https://www.guttmacher.org/statepolicy/explore/requirements-ultrasound
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 570 U.S., 186 L. Ed. 2d 768 (2013).
Howard, Robert M., and Jeffrey A. Segal 2004. “A Preference for Deference? The Supreme
Court and Judicial Review.” Political Research Quarterly 57: 131-43.
In re Marriage cases, 183 P.3d 384, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008).
Johnston, Robert. 2017. "Historical abortion statistics, United States.” Retrieved from
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/ab-unitedstates.html
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
Keck, Thomas. 2014. Judicial Politics in Polarized Times. Chicago” University Chicago Press.
Keck, Thomas. 2004. The Most Activist Court in History: The Road to Modern Judicial

Conservatism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

57

Keck, Thomas and Logan Strother. 2016. “Judicial Impact.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
Politics: 1-24.
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 289 Conn. 135, 289 Ct. 135 (2008).
Kramer, Larry D. 2000. “Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism.”
Columbia Law Review 100: 215-293.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003).
Lemieux, Scott. 2004. “Constitutional Politics and the Political Impact of Abortion Litigation:
Judicial Power and Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective.” PhD diss.,
University of Washington.
Lens, Vicki. 2001. “The Supreme Court, Federalism, and Social Policy: The New Judicial
Activism.” The University of Chicago Press 75: 318-336.
Lewis, Gregory and Seong Soo Oh. 2008. “Public Opinion and State Action on Same-Sex
Marriage.” State & Local Government Review 40: 42-53.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010 (1967).
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983).
Morgan, Richard Gregory. 1979. “Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the Pre-Roe Case Law.”
Michigan Law Review 77: 1724-1748.
Nova Health Systems v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28, 2012 O.K. 103 (Okla. 2012).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071, 191 L. Ed. 2d 953, 576 U.S. (2015).
People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
Pew Research Center. 2016 (March 17-27). “Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage.”
Retrieved from http://www.pewforum.org/2016/05/12/changing-attitudes-on-gaymarriage/
Pew Research Center Survey. 2017. “Public Opinion on Abortion Views on abortion, 19952016.” http://www.pewforum.org/2017/01/11/public-opinion-on-abortion-2/
Pew Research Center. 2015. “Same-sex Marriage, State by State.” Retrieved from
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/
Pickerill, J. Mitchell and Cornell Clayton. 2004. “The Rehnquist Court and the Political

Dynamics of Federalism.” Perspectives on Politics 2: 233-48.

58

Pickerill, J. Mitchell. 2004. Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial
Review in a Separate System. Durham: Duke University Press.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1992).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1996).
Rosenberg, Gerald N. 2008. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Scheingold Stuart A. 1974. The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Shaw, Greg M. 2003. “Trends Abortion.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 67: 407-429.
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 11 Wash. App. 247, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (Ct. App. 1974).
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 147 L. Ed. 2d 743 (2000).
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (2009).
Sunstein, Cass R. 1999. One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Tarr, G. Alan. 1994. “The Past and Future of the new Judicial Federalism.” Publius 24(2): 63-79.
Texas Medical Providers v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
The Harris Poll. 2006. “Support for Roe vs. Wade Declines to Lowest Level Ever, Says Harris
Poll.” Retrieved from http://media.theharrispoll.com/documents/Harris-Interactive-PollResearch-FOR-IMMEDIATE-RELEASE-2006-05.pdf.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 570 U.S. 12, 186 L. Ed. 2d 808 (2013).
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 106 L. Ed. 2d 410
(1989).
Wechsler, Herbert. 1954. “The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government.” Columbia Law Review 54: 543560.

59
Whittington, Keith E. 1999. Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional
Powers and Constitutional Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 579 U.S., 195 L. Ed. 2d 665 (2016).
Yoo, John. 1997. “The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism.” Southern California Law Reviw 70:
1311-1405.
Yoo, John C. 1998. “Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s.” Indiana Law
Review 32: 27–44.
Young, Earnest A. 2002. “Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics.” University of Colorado
Law Review 73: 1139-1410.

